Indian Independence: The Real Story Behind the Partition

After 75 years, hardly people know the real reasons behind India's Partition. Recently declassified files of the British Archives tell the truth.

Introduction

Buried in the London Archives was the truth of the Indian Partition. Religion was just a narrative which acted like a smoke screen for Britain to achieve its strategic objectives in the Subcontinent. India was a victim of the Great Game between the USSR & Britain. The accidental discovery of the same led Narendra Singh Sarila, a son of the Maharaja of Sarila, former Aide de camp to Louis Mountbatten & a civil servant in the Indian Foreign Service (1948-1985) to expand his research into the British Library London, Hartley Library Southhampton, United States Foreign Relations Documents & Nehru Memorial Museum. The study followed the publication of a groundbreaking book called 'The Shadows of the Great Game: The Untold Story of India's Partition. This article explores the strategic interests of the British as well as how Britain was prosperous in creating those narratives. 

The Great Game

By the 1870s, the Russian Empire of Czars had expanded to Samarkhand & was just a few hundred miles away from Kashmir. The British had fought three wars with Afghanistan & had incorporated parts of Afghanistan into the North Western Frontier Province [NWFP]. At the beginning of the twentieth century, Afghanistan became a sort of buffer state between Russia & the British Raj. Britain had a policy based on Henry Rawlinson & John Lawerance's ideals. Rawlinson has stated, "If the Czar's officers acquire a foothold in Kabul the disquietening effect will be prodigious. Every native ruler throughout northern India who either has, or fancies he has, a grievance, or is even cramped or incommoded by our orderly government, will begin intriguing with the Russians."[1]  Lawerance on the other hand stated, "The Less the Afghans see us, the less they will dislike us."[2] Meanwhile, the Russian Perspective was, "Not only did Russia need markets & lands, but she would bring science and railroads to backward people. Asia was to Russia what undiscovered America was to Europe."[3]  Rudyard Kipling termed it 'The Great Game'.

Field Marshal Wavell, Indian Viceroy from 1943-46 was the first person to recognize that the British Power was fading & the Indan National Congress would not cooperate with the British to station British Army Bases in India. So, he found the answer in the Muslim League which would succeed in separating the northeast from the rest of India. Churchill had visualised the creation of Hindustan, Princesstan & Pakistan, but Unlike him, Wavell had actually visualised the partition the way it is today.

Blunders & Blunders

The irony of Jinnah's life was that for the first sixty years of his life he worked for a united India. Jinnah’s difficulties began after Gandhi returned from South Africa in 1915. In the 1920 Nagpur Congress session, Jinnah and Gandhi clashed. Jinnah was openly booed in the presence of his young wife Ruttie, with Gandhi refusing to intervene. In 1928 Jinnah persuaded the Muslim league to give up a separate electorate in return for 33% Muslim seats in the central legislature, separation of Sind from Bombay Presidency and recognition of NWFP and Baluchistan as separate entities. This, he reasoned, would enable the Muslims to dominate five provinces and help reduce communal differences. Congress rejected this proposal. Angling for his son Jawaharlal to be elected Congress President, Motilal Nehru did not want to risk upsetting Congress leaders by supporting Jinnah. In the midst of this major crisis in his career, Ruttie decided to leave him. Badly scarred, Jinnah left for England in 1933 to concentrate on his legal practice. It was Liaqat Ali Khan who persuaded Jinnah to return and contest the 1937 elections.

The 1937 resignations of the Indian National Congress from a hard-won election victory gave an opposite effect than what was aimed. British rather than giving up on the pressure ignored the same & this led to a reduction in the bargaining power of the INC. Jinnah termed this as a 'Himalayan Blunder' while V.P Krishna Menon called it 'lamentable political wisdom'.[4] When Jinnah proclaimed a separate nation, the Congress remained mum. The Americans were of the view that an undivided independent India was crucial to gain their much-needed cooperation in the war effort. Second, an independent united India would give a positive signal to the rest of Asia. ‘Asia for Asiatics’ was a significant part of the American vision for the post-war world order.

Jinnah's life ended as exploited by hard-liners like Liaqat Ali Khan, used by the British for strategic interests and consumed by his own ambition, he died a bitter man. Colonel Ilahi Bakhsh, his doctor heard Jinnah say, ‘I have made Pakistan, but I am convinced that I have committed the greatest blunder of my life.’[5] 

Those Missions: The Cripps's Mission, Cabinet Misson

Winston Churchill has written in his memoris stated that he was elated the night he went to sleep after he got the news of the attack on pearl harbour.[6] The days after which he had a meeting with the American President that time the American President Roosevelt was putting pressure on Churchill to grant self-governance to an undivided India. He felt that this was best course to gain India’s cooperation in the war effort.[7] To deflect the pressure, Churchill decided to send Sir Stafford Cripps to India. The so-called 'Mission' was planned in such a way that it would anyways fail. The Objectives were kept as follows:

• Immediately after the war India would be independent either within or outside the Commonwealth.
• In the interim a politically representative Executive Council would be formed under the Viceroy.
• The princely states would have the right to stay out of the proposed Indian Union if they so choose.
• The proposal had to be accepted or rejected as a whole.[8] 

For the first time the idea of princely states not being part of the union was tabled. The real motive behind the mission can be crystallized from what Foreign Secretary Amery said to the then Viceroy Linlithgow. She stated, "As for the Congress their adverse reaction may be all the greater when they discover that the nest (the offer) contains Pakistan Cookoo’s (sic) egg."[9]  As expected the Congress Party rejected the proposal on 11 April 1942 on the lines that the option to join or not was not acceptable as by it the unity of India could not be achieved. But surprisingly the resolution rejecting the proposal even stated, " Nevertheless, The [Congress working] committee cannot think in terms of compelling the people of any territorial unit to remain in the Indian Union against their declared and established will."[10] This was inexplicable since the Congress had consistently considered India undivided. It raised doubts about its commitment to India’s unity & for the British achieved their objectives of placating the Americans, giving Jinnah hope and putting the Congress into a dilemma. The Congress on its part, erred terribly in diluting its position on the integrity of India and by not joining the Executive council. It is arguable that by joining they could have exerted power and signaled their cooperation in the war effort. This would have been useful to garner support of the British public and the Americans. The risk of the princely states seceding was low too. 

The Allahabad Congress resolution which was discussed & drafted in close doors was leaked to British intelligence by two Communist Members of the Congress Party. The Communist Party had switched loyalty from the Nationalists to the British after Russia was attacked by the Germans. In the same draft meeting, Nehru was quoted saying, "It is Gandhiji’s feeling that Japan and Germany will win. This feeling unconsciously governs his thinking." This message was picked by London through the British Intelligence &sent to Roosevelt to denounce Gandhi as ‘a fifth columnist.'[11]

In 1945, Wavell held another conference to discuss the formation of a politically representative Executive Council. Jinnah was tutored by a member of the Viceroy’s council to sabotage the meeting in return for the promise of Pakistan. Hence as early as June 1945 Jinnah was taken into confidence on the creation of Pakistan.In the same year, Churchill lost the election and Clement Atlee took over as Prime Minister. Unlike Churchill, Atlee's objective was to partition India but make it appear that the Congress wanted it. His second objective was to persuade Jinnah to accept a truncated Pakistan like the Wavell plan of Pakistan which was pretty much how Pakistan was finally created. 

In 1946, Cripps to reach out to Nehru and ask for his suggestion on Partition. On 27 January 1946, Nehru wrote a 3500-word letter in which he mentioned plebecite for territories who wished to secede. Atlee decoded this as the Congress being ‘flexible’ on separation & started work towards Wavell's Pakistan. 

Conclusion

Atlee played in a very wise & deceptive manner. The Cabinet Mission like the Cripps Mission had an agenda but this time to succeed & the agenda was in such a way that all sides would get a compromise, but the British Strategic Interest would succeed. The referendum in the North Western Frontier Province & Abdul Gafar Khan's as well as Nehru's miscalculations allowed the province to slip to Pakistan & more so the Congress's flexibility hurted the idea or a united India as the Americans were very much keenly interested for an undivided India. After the Congress accepted the Cabinet Mission, the American leadership felt that walking the tightrope by again pressing the issue was of no use. 

After the Partition, Pakistan joined the Baghdad Pact & the CENTO. And the Pakistan became a key state in the American Side during the cold war. Pakistan was used to make China establish relations with the west & dump the Soviets & even as a launchpad for the War in Afghanistan which was a key component in the fall of the Soviet Union. Pakistan was thus used as a shield from the USSR for the Guld & middle east. On 3rd June, 1947 when the partition was announced, a week later at the labour party's Annual Conference the then Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin stated, "The Division of India would help to consolidate Britain in the Middle East."[12]

Citations

1] Henry Rawlinson, England and Russia (John Murry, London, 1975, pp 279-280.)

2] Quoted by Pendrel Moon, The British Conquest & Dominiation of India, Volume 2, India Research Press, Delhi, 1999, pg 856.

3] Fyodor Dostoyevsky, The Diary of a Writer, translated by Boris Barsol, Scribner's Sons, New York, 1949, pp 1051-1052. 

4] VP Krishna Menon, Transfer of Power in India, London 1957, pg 52.

5] Mahir Ali, The Vision we lost, Dawn, 13th August 2013

6] Winston Churchill, Memories of the Second World War, Volume 6, War Comes to America (Cassel & Co, London, 1950, pp 209-10) 

7] Ibid, p 188. 

8] V.P Menon, Transfer of Power in India (Longman Green, London, 1957, p. 124)

9] TOP, Volume 1, S. No 296

10] Ibid, S.No 605, Resolution of the Congress Working Committee issued 11 April 1942. 

11] TOP II, S. No 113, dated 31 May 1942, enclosure No 113, gives the entire proceedings to the Allahabad session. 

12] Mountbatten Papers (MB1/E, 104, Hartley Library, Southampton).